Blackness as Fighting Words by Toussaint, Etienne C.
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Faculty Publications Law School 
12-2020 
Blackness as Fighting Words 
Etienne C. Toussaint 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Law Commons 
COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
 
124 
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
ONLINE 
VOLUME 106 DECEMBER 2020 124–163 
ESSAY 
BLACKNESS AS FIGHTING WORDS 
Etienne C. Toussaint* 
“It’s in they job description to terminate the threat / So 41 shots to the body is 
what he can expect.” — Talib Kweli, The Proud1 
“I believe that this nation can only heal from the wounds of racism if we all 
begin to love blackness. . . . That which is best within us, . . . that which is 
faltering, which is wounded, which is contradictory, incomplete.” — bell 
hooks2  
INTRODUCTION  
Where I grew up, the wrong words could turn an innocent sparring 
match of playground taunts and after-school gibes into a full-out asphalt 
brawl. Naïve boys enacting popular tropes of Black hypermasculinity,3 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke 
School of Law. I thank colleagues who provided comments and feedback on this Essay, 
including Philip Lee, Diane Klein, Khaled Beydoun, Mae Quinn, Brandon Hasbrouck, Diego 
Alcala, Joshua P. Fershée, and Kathleen Hoke. I also thank Sabrin Qadi, Stephanie Kamey, 
and Bradley Cunningham for research assistance. Any errors or omissions contained in this 
Essay are my own. 
1 Talib Kweli, The Proud, on Quality (Rawkus Records 2002). 
2 Melvin McLeod, “There’s No Place To Go But Up”—bell hooks and Maya Angelou in 
Conversation, Lion’s Roar (Jan. 1, 1998), https://hlionsroar.com/theres-no-place-to-go-but-
up/ [https://perma.cc/K5Y3-HXQE]. 
3 See, e.g., LL Cool J, Mama Said Knock You Out (Def Jam 1990) (“I’m rocking my peers 
/ Puttin’ suckers in fear / Makin’ the tears rain down like a monsoon / Listen to the bass go 
boom.”). 
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we would often form a circle around the contenders, laughing as they 
hurled jokes back and forth about athletic ability or sneaker selection or 
skin color into the cypher. “You so stupid you tried to save a fish from 
drowning.” “You so ugly even Hello Kitty said goodbye.” “You so black 
you gotta wear white gloves to eat chocolate.” But inevitably, as soon as 
someone uttered that dreaded phrase—“Yo mama”—the playful 
exchange always took a turn for the worse. We all knew there was no 
turning back at that point. In the South Bronx, those were fighting words. 
As a Black youth roaming New York City’s urban metropolis in the 
1990s, mastering the nuances of fighting words was critical to 
maintaining close friendships and keeping potential enemies at bay. 
However, in the age of Donald Trump, fighting words have taken on new 
meaning. In response to sharp critiques of his political agenda—from 
assertions that his tax reforms benefit the wealthy, to contentions that his 
Muslim bans have incited political Islamophobia, to revelations that his 
trade manipulations influence immigration policy4—Trump’s brazen 
rhetorical style has transformed the bully pulpit into a stage for bullying.5 
Whereas the fighting words of my youth reflected bruised egos and 
shallow differences of opinion, the fighting words of Donald Trump have 
normalized “racist, sexist, homophobic, and xenophobic rhetoric” from 
the leader of the United States that too often has fanned the flames of 
racial violence.6 With the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
 
4 See, e.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, “Muslims Bans” and the (Re)making of Political 
Islamophobia, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1733, 1768 (defining political Islamophobia as “a strategy 
to garner votes, particularly among disaffected segments of the electorate who take to bigoted 
and xenophobic messaging”); see also Jeff Ernsthausen & Justin Elliott, Billionaires Keep 
Benefiting from a Tax Break To Help the Poor. Now, Congress Wants To Investigate., 
ProPublica (Nov. 8, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/billionaires-keep-
benefiting-from-a-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-now-congress-wants-to-investigate 
[https://perma.cc/33BD-AE76] (describing criticism of the Trump administration’s handling 
of tax “opportunity zones”); Felicia Sonmez & David J. Lynch, Trump’s Erratic Policy Moves 
Put National Security at Risk, Experts Warn, Wash. Post (June 23, 2019, 8:15 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-erratic-policy-moves-put-national-secur-
ity-at-risk-experts-warn/2019/06/23/9cfae958-95d2-11e9-830a-21b9b36b64ad_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KCR3-9ZMX] (noting the Trump administration’s manipulation of trade 
negotiations to influence immigration policy). 
5 See Heather Digby Parton, Trump Has Used the “Bully Pulpit” More than Any President 
in History—and That’s Terrifying, Salon (Apr. 8, 2020, 1:35 PM), 
https://www.salon.com/2020/04/08/trump-has-used-the-bully-pulpit-more-than-any-
president-in-history--and-thats-terrifying/ [https://perma.cc/F47B-PVQ6]; Atiba R. Ellis, 
Normalizing Domination, 20 CUNY L. Rev. 493, 493 (2017). 
6 Ellis, supra note 5, at 493. 
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coupled with a new onslaught of citizen murders at the hands of police 
officers, Donald Trump’s presidency—one marred by impeachment 
proceedings on charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress7—
has devolved into social unrest, nationwide uprisings, and the unraveling 
of law and order.8 
The resurgence of worldwide protests by racial justice activists has 
ushered in a global reckoning with the meaning of this generation’s 
rallying cry—“Black Lives Matter.”9 As cities emblazon their streets with 
this expression in massive artistic murals,10 the Trump administration has 
responded with the militarized policing of non-violent public 
demonstrations, revealing not merely a disregard for public safety, but far 
worse, a concerted dismantling of protestors’ First Amendment rights.11 
Yet despite a surging pandemic, Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) protests 
have persisted.12 Accordingly, this Essay considers the implications of 
 
7 See Lili Loofbourow, Impeachment Is a Permanent Stain on Trump’s Presidency, Slate 
(Dec. 18, 2019, 8:44 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/12/impeachment-impact-
trump-presidency-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/2XHX-9X7Z]; Nicholas Fandos & Michael 
D. Shear, Trump Impeached for Abuse of Power and Obstruction of Congress, N.Y. Times 
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/us/politics/trump-impeached.html 
[https://perma.cc/2RZN-TX2W]. 
8 See Stephen Collinson, While Trump Shelters in the White House, America Cries out for 
Leadership, CNN (June 1, 2020, 9:50 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/01/politics/trump-
white-house-racial-unrest-leadership/index.html [https://perma.cc/3HKU-PMDN].  
9 See generally Christopher J. LeBron, The Making of Black Lives Matter: A Brief History 
of an Idea (2017) (positioning Black Lives Matter within the historical Black intellectual 
tradition); Jen Kirby, “Black Lives Matter” Has Become a Global Rallying Cry Against 
Racism and Police Brutality, Vox (June 12, 2020, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2020/6/12/21285244/black-lives-matter-global-protests-george-floyd-
uk-belgium. 
10 See Leah Asmelash, Washington’s New Black Lives Matter Street Mural Is Captured in 
Satellite Image, CNN (June 6, 2020, 4:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/us/black-
lives-matter-dc-street-mural-space-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/68B7-6AK5]; Wyatte 
Grantham-Philips, Powerful Photos Show ‘Black Lives Matter’ Painted Across Streets 
Nationwide, USA Today (June 19, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/-nation/-
2020/06/17/black-lives-matter-painted-city-streets-see-art-nyc-washington/3204742001/ 
[https://perma.cc/V6MQ-KKP5].  
11 See Garrett Epps, Trump’s Grotesque Violation of the First Amendment, Atlantic (June 
2, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/trumps-grotesque-violation-
first-amendment/612532/ [https://perma.cc/T776-XVE6]; Katie Bo Williams, Trump, GOP 
Allies Reach for Military Response to Domestic Protests, Defense One (June 1, 2020, 11:21 
PM), https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/06/trump-and-allies-reach-military-
response-domestic-protests/165819/ [https://perma.cc/H9KZ-45ZB]. 
12 See Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the 
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/-
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this generation’s acclamation of Black humanity amidst the social 
tensions exposed during the age of COVID-19. What does the Trump 
administration’s militarized response to BLM protests mean in a world 
mutilated by the scars of racial oppression, a wound laid bare by 
America’s racially biased, aggressive, and supervisory culture of 
policing? 
In response, this Essay suggests and defends a singular contention: 
Black identity itself, or “Blackness”13—whether articulated by the pure 
speech of racial justice activists who affirm Black humanity, or embodied 
by the symbolic speech of Black bodies assembled in collective dissent in 
the public square—has become “‘fighting’ words” in the consciousness 




13 Articulating a robust definition of “Blackness” is beyond the scope of this Essay, but a 
few points are noteworthy. First, this dialogue does not presume an a priori concept of 
Blackness, that is, one divorced from the discourses and embedded interests that seek to name 
it. Second, there is a subtle distinction between “Black” and “Blackness”—while Black is a 
racial identity that generally “implies the presence of a significant amount of melanin in one’s 
skin,” the term Blackness implies something else, “a shared set of historical, social, and 
cultural mores[,] . . . a sociocultural marker indicating that one acts in culturally specific 
ways.” Rone Shavers, Fear of a Performative Planet: Troubling the Concept of “Post-
Blackness”, in The Trouble with Post-Blackness 81, 82 (Houston A. Baker Jr. & K. Merinda 
Simmons eds., Colum. Univ. Press 2015). As a result, Blackness is a contested concept. Many 
performative markers of Blackness do not originate from Black culture, but they instead are 
imposed upon it, imbuing the concept of Blackness with both a masking and revelatory nature. 
See id. at 84. Third, notwithstanding the contested nature of Blackness as a sociocultural 
concept that defines both ethnic and racial identity, this Essay embraces the notion of 
Blackness evoked by Paul Gilroy as a “‘changing’ same.” Paul Gilroy, Sounds Authentic: 
Black Music, Ethnicity, and the Challenge of a Changing Same, 11 Black Music Rsch. J. 111, 
111 (1991). While the performative aspects of Blackness are always evolving, Blackness 
continues to reflect the unwavering tradition of freedom struggle in response to the enduring 
mythologies of white supremacy. See id. at 113, 122–23, 134–35 (arguing against essentialism 
in Black cultural analysis, but concluding that concepts of Blackness, particularly as expressed 
in music, can authentically change over time and diversify, even if rooted in similar stories 
and the same history). 
14 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“‘[F]ighting’ 
words . . . [are] those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that 
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”); 
see also Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (holding similarly that “breach[es] of 
the peace” are not protected by the First Amendment because “[w]hen clear and present danger 
of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to 
public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious” 
(quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940))).  
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The very utterance of the phrase “Black Lives Matter” tends to incite 
imminent violence and unbridled rage from police in city streets across 
America. Discussions of “Black Lives Matter” by pundits tend to conjure 
images of subversion, disorder, and looting, the racialized narratives of 
social unrest commonly portrayed by the media.15 Yet the words “Black 
Lives Matter” and the peaceful assembly of Black protestors also 
encapsulate the righteous indignation burning in the hearts of minoritized 
citizens. Discussions of “Black Lives Matter” by activists and scholars 
evoke what Cornel West calls the “prophetic pragmatism” of the Black 
radical tradition, a historic commitment to the democratic ideals of 
equality and liberty amidst entrenched systems of racial subordination.16  
This dynamic reflects unresolved tensions in the First Amendment’s 
treatment of racial relations in America, a wrenching of the spirit that 
Critical Race Theorists Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic argue “lies at 
the heart of two of our deepest values—civil rights and equal respect, on 
the one hand, and freedom of speech on the other.”17 While the First 
Amendment is often heralded as an exemplar of American legal 
exceptionalism,18 in practice it has become, as Justin Hansford declares, 
“a racial project.”19 Similar to Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property, 
 
15 See Paul Farhi & Elahe Izadi, ‘Carnage,’ ‘Radicals,’ ‘Overthrow the Government’: How 





16 See Cornel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America 139 (1993) (describing 
prophetic pragmatism as a creative appropriation of the philosophical tradition of pragmatism 
from the perspective of the oppressed, and as a practice that “analyzes the social causes of 
unnecessary forms of social misery, promotes moral outrage against them, organizes different 
constituencies to alleviate them, yet does so with an openness to its own blindnesses and 
shortcomings”).  
17 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound 2, 6 (2004); see 
also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 
1990 Duke L.J. 431, 434 (discussing the nuances of protecting racist speech under the First 
Amendment); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s 
Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2320, 2322 (1989) (discussing the victims of hate speech 
protected under the First Amendment); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action 
for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133, 134 (1982) 
(arguing for a new tort for victims of racial insults).  
18 See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in American Exceptionalism 
and Human Rights 31 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).  
19 Justin Hansford, The First Amendment Freedom of Assembly as a Racial Project, 127 
Yale L.J.F. 685, 690 (2018); see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial 
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which unmasked the way race neutrality in law and public policy 
rationalizes the “property” rights of white privilege,20 this Essay exposes 
how seemingly neutral constitutional constructs rationalize “the ‘iron fist’ 
of the penal state” in response to both traditional violent crime and 
peaceful public protest, smothering the constitutional rights of Black and 
Brown citizens by legitimating “the extra-penological functions of penal 
institutions.”21 As Devon Carbado explains, police officers routinely use 
violence in Black and Brown communities not to quell social disruption 
but rather to reinforce social control.22 Such discretionary measures, as 
Dorothy Roberts clarifies, pave the way for police abuse of order-
maintenance policies that, similar to vague loitering laws that the 
Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional, “give police a wide net to trap 
citizens who look dangerous” and “also allow police to discriminate 
against citizens based on personal prejudices.”23 Building upon such 
scholarship, this Essay provides three contributions to the ongoing 
discourse on policing in America.  
First, it reveals how racial tensions in the First Amendment—focusing 
specifically on ambiguities in the fighting-words doctrine—perpetuate 
 
Preferences: Rethinking Racial Projects, in Racial Formation in the Twenty-First Century 183, 
183 (Daniel Martinez HoSang, Oneka LaBennett & Laura Pulido eds., 2012).  
20 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1709 (1993); see also 
id. at 1715 (arguing that “Whiteness as property has taken on more subtle forms, but retains 
its core characteristic—the legal legitimation of expectations of power and control that 
enshrine the status quo as a neutral baseline, while masking the maintenance of white privilege 
and domination”).  
21 Loïc Wacquant, The Punitive Regulation of Poverty in the Neoliberal Age, 
openDemocracy (Aug. 1, 2011), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/punitive-
regulation-of-poverty-in-neoliberal-age/ [https://perma.cc/AH9C-7RZC]; see also id. (noting 
“that, in the wake of the race riots of the 1960s, the police, courts and prison have been 
deployed to contain the urban dislocations wrought by economic deregulation and the 
implosion of the ghetto as an ethno-racial container, and to impose the discipline of insecure 
employment at the bottom of the polarizing class structure”). 
22 See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the 
Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479, 1482–83, 1515 (2016) (“Approaches to policing that are designed 
to signal to lay people that police officers are in charge of or ‘own’ the community they police 
encourage police officers to employ policing as a source of governance strategy to socially 
control communities.”); Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. Rev. 545, 563 
(2017) (noting that “[t]he relationship among social control policing, mass criminalization, 
and arrest likely shaped policing dynamics in Ferguson”); cf. L. Song Richardson, Police Use 
of Force, in 2 Reforming Criminal Justice 185, 194–95 (2017) (describing how police’s “racial 
anxiety may cause officers to enact command presence when it is unnecessary,” which can 
lead to violence).  
23 Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 775, 777, 789–90 (1999). 
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the racially biased, aggressive, and supervisory culture of American 
policing,24 an approach to law enforcement that Paul Gowder calls the 
“command model” due to its arbitrary usage of commands to organize 
and control social space.25 Such tensions are laid bare when peaceful 
assemblies of BLM protestors who petition the government for redress of 
racial grievances are deemed disturbances of the peace by police officers 
and met by violent police force, actions that implicate the fighting-words 
doctrine and call into question the contours of unprotected speech. 
Importantly, such discretionary authority reveals the misplaced focus of 
the fighting-words doctrine on the inability of the recipient of fighting 
words to restrain themselves from violence and not on the actual 
substance of the words spoken. This framing renders the police officer as 
judge, jury, and executioner when it comes to interpreting the meaning of 
Black protest speech.26 
Second, this Essay analyzes how such racial tensions in the First 
Amendment—as conveyed by a racially biased and aggressive police 
culture—cast a dark shadow over the liberty of Black and Brown citizens 
who experience racism at the hands of police yet avoid acts of protest for 
fear of bodily harm or arrest, resulting in a chilling effect on free speech.27 
To be sure, the fighting-words doctrine has garnered limited attention in 
legal scholarship,28 and it might even be deemed inconsequential, as 
courts have narrowed its applicability to verbal disputes between citizens 
 
24 See, e.g., Vesla Weaver, Gwen Prowse & Spencer Piston, Withdrawing and Drawing in: 
Political Discourse in Policed Communities, J. Race Ethnicity & Pol. 1, 3 (2020) (examining 
“how black participants in poor and working-class neighborhoods co-construct meaning 
around state authority in conversation with one another, given their unique experience with 
state violence, surveillance, and discipline, and police as enforcers of racial order”).  
25 See Paul Gowder, A Rule of Law Case for Police Abolition 8 (July 24, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
26 See, e.g., Stamm v. Miller, 14-cv-11951, 2015 WL 13047103, at *1, *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
27, 2015) (noting, in a wrongful death case for unlawful use of deadly force, the defendant 
officer’s psychological evaluations in which he “described the role of the police as ‘judge, 
jury, and executioner’”), aff’d, 657 F. App’x 492 (6th Cir. 2016). 
27 See, e.g., Matthew Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Violence 
and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81 Am. Socio. Rev. 857, 858 (2016) 
(revealing how high-profile cases of police violence and misconduct against unarmed citizens, 
especially in low-income Black neighborhoods, can undermine the legitimacy of legal 
authority and suppress police-related 911 calls).  
28 See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 Wash. U. L.Q. 531, 535 (1980); 
see also Mark Pearlstein, Constitutional Law—The “Fighting Words Doctrine” Is Applied to 
Abusive Language Toward Policemen, 22 DePaul L. Rev. 725 (1973); Burton Caine, The 
Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First 
Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 441 (2004).  
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and police officers.29 Indeed, modern courts rarely enforce convictions 
based upon the usage of “fighting words” to disturb the peace.30 
Notwithstanding, this Essay accomplishes important philosophical work, 
framing foundational constitutional constructs in the context of Black 
lived experience, which raises disconcerting questions about the 
American democratic project. Does the existence of a legal regime that 
threatens to criminalize anti-racist public speech if it harms its target and 
incites an immediate breach of the peace (even if such arrests are routinely 
unenforced by courts) constitute a culture of suppression that silences 
dissent with fear of police retaliation? A rule of law driven by fear of the 
police not only distorts the ideal of liberty that underscores liberal 
democracy, but it also is eerily reminiscent of the culture of slave patrols 
that threatened the lives of defiant Black Americans in Antebellum 
America.31 
Third, by highlighting racial tensions in the fighting-words doctrine, 
this Essay illuminates the embeddedness of racism in American policing 
culture more generally. This culture not only constructs and reconstitutes 
the social order by perpetuating stereotypes of minoritized communities 
as sites of disorder that require constant supervision, but it also degrades 
the dignity of Black and Brown Americans by treating them as second-
class citizens unworthy of private autonomy, while hindering the broader 
policing goal of minimizing crime.32 Perhaps this explains why some 
people choose to run at the very sight of police officers. Collectively, 
these insights lend support toward recent demands for police abolition 
from activists and legal scholars,33 which build upon a rich tradition of 
 
29 See infra note 106. 
30 See infra note 106.  
31 See infra Part II. 
32 See, e.g., Rod K. Brunson, Protests Focus on Over-Policing. But Under-Policing Is Also 
Deadly, Wash. Post (June 12, 2020, 9:10 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/underpolicing-cities-violent-
crime/2020/06/12/b5d1fd26-ac0c-11ea-9063-e69bd6520940_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/EL36-JP4J] (“The result is that many black and brown communities now 
suffer from the worst of all worlds: over-aggressive police behavior in frequent encounters 
with residents, coupled with the inability of law enforcement to effectively protect public 
safety.”).  
33 See, e.g., Derecka Purnell, How I Became a Police Abolitionist, Atlantic (July 6, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/how-i-became-police-abolition-
ist/613540/ [https://perma.cc/S6AB-6QK2]; Zak Cheney-Rice, Why Police Abolition Is a 
Useful Framework—Even for Skeptics, N,Y. Mag. (June 15, 2020), 
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/06/police-abolitionist-lessons-for-america.html; V. 
Noah Gimbel & Craig Muhammad, Are Police Obsolete? Breaking Cycles of Violence 
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abolition scholarship from Angela Davis, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Mariame 
Kaba, and others.34  
Part I of this Essay offers a retrospective on the Author’s personal 
discovery of the nature of Blackness as fighting words through the story 
of Amadou Diallo in the Bronx, New York. Then, Part II discusses how 
America’s legacy of white supremacy has infringed upon the First 
Amendment rights of Black and Brown citizens, including during the 
presidential administration of Donald Trump. Next, Part III explores the 
origins of the fighting-words doctrine and highlights its inconsistent 
treatment among courts, which has inspired ambiguity regarding its 
present-day meaning. Part IV then reveals how such inconsistencies and 
ambiguities raise important questions about the limits of constitutional 
protection for Black and Brown citizens who encounter racism at the 
hands of police while engaging in acts of protest. Finally, Part V suggests 
that the ambiguities surrounding the Constitution’s protection (or lack 
thereof) of anti-racist speech that incites violence and disturbs the peace 
explains why some police officers believe they are authorized to use force 
in response to non-violent BLM protests.  
Taken together, this Essay contends that until we as a nation wrestle 
with the racial subtext of modern policing—a culture woven into law that 
not only silences the legitimate public protests of minoritized citizens in 
violation of their First Amendment rights but also rationalizes callous 
violence at the hands of law enforcement—Black America will remain at 
peril to the veil of white supremacy that looms over the American 
constitutional order. Importantly, this is not a call to transgress race or 
usher in an era of post-Blackness. In other scholarship, I note the 
importance of embracing the cultural specificity of Blackness to dislodge 
the perceived neutrality of Whiteness.35 Nor is this an attempt to 
 
Through Abolition Democracy, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 1453, 1458–59 (2019); Alex S. Vitale, 
The End of Policing 228 (2017).  
34 See, e.g., Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? 9–10 (2003); Eduardo Mendieta, 
Introduction, in Abolition Democracy: Beyond Empire, Prisons, and Torture 7, 16 (2005); 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing 
California 242 (2007); Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might 
Change Your Mind, N.Y. Times Mag. (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html 
[https://perma.cc/6NVJ-A6PA]; Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, 
N.Y. Times (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-
abolish-defund-police.html [https://perma.cc/R6AQ-RL8Z].  
35 See Etienne C. Toussaint, Dismantling the Master’s House: Toward a Justice-Based 
Theory of Community Economic Development, 53 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 337, 407–08 (2019) 
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essentialize Black identity or Black performativity as something to be 
pitied. As Imani Perry eloquently retorted, “I must turn the pitying gaze 
back upon any who offer it to me, because they cannot understand the 
spiritual majesty of joy in suffering.”36 Rather, and simply, this Essay 
bears witness to the absurdity and perversity of state-sponsored violence 
at any and all affirmations of Black humanity, and beckons America to a 
moral reckoning. 
I. LIVING IN YOUR AMERICAN SKIN 
I was thirteen years old when I first learned that sometimes “fighting 
words” don’t require any words at all. I didn’t realize when I got off the 
public bus on my way home from school that the crowd of people 
gathered in the street near the barbershop were protestors. I didn’t know 
on that February afternoon why my neighbors were so angry, jumping up 
and down like a Sunday morning choir, each person echoing the words of 
a heavyset Black preacher who barked lyrics into a megaphone on an 
elevated platform, his permed hair waving in the wind.37 I didn’t know 
why the mother at the front of the pack was howling, nor why the 
neighborhood kids hovered nearby on Huffy bikes like anxious pups 
learning how to hunt. I didn’t know what was happening until later that 
night because it was the year 1999; our modern culture of camera phones 
and citizen recordings of police interactions had not yet been invented. 
The nightly news would have to suffice. 
After sneaking another Little Debbie Fudge Round from the kitchen 
cabinet, I learned on the Channel 4 News that the crowd of people 
gathered three blocks from my home were angry about an incident 
involving a twenty-three-year-old Black man named Amadou Diallo.38 I 
 
(“Viewing CED through a justice-based lens urges us to embrace a collective democratic 
responsibility to resolve our country’s legacy of institutional racism and economic segregation 
through law reform.”). 
36 Imani Perry, Racism Is Terrible. Blackness Is Not., Atlantic (June 15, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/racism-terrible-blackness-not/613039/ 
[https://perma.cc/G63D-TDMU].  
37 See Kit R. Roane, Sharpton Among 28 Arrested in Rally on Diallo Killing, N.Y. Times 
(Mar. 4, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/04/nyregion/sharpton-among-28-arrested-
in-rally-on-diallo-killing.html [https://perma.cc/WX34-HZ9B]; Ese Olumhense, 20 Years 
After the NYPD Killing of Amadou Diallo, His Mother and Community Ask: What’s 
Changed?, N.Y. Mag. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/after-the-
nypd-killing-of-amadou-diallo-whats-changed.html. 
38 Trial by Media: 41 Shots (Netflix 2020); Christian Red, Years Before Black Lives Matter, 
41 Shots Killed Him, N.Y. Times (July 19, 2019), 
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learned that four New York City plainclothes police officers had fired 
forty-one copper-jacketed bullets from 9mm Glock semi-automatic guns 
at Amadou in front of his apartment house doorway, not too far from the 
corner store bodega where I often purchased Sour Power Strawberry 
Straws.39 I learned that the police officers claimed to have mistaken 
Amadou for a serial rape suspect from one year prior.40 I learned that 
Amadou was possibly reaching for his wallet, perhaps to show his ID, 
when the police officers started shooting.41 I learned that Amadou was 
shot before he even told the officers his name,42 before he had the chance 
to defend his honor as a man with a mother and father who cared.43 I 
learned that Amadou was simply a West African immigrant street peddler 
of bootlegged tapes and cheap tube socks, perhaps hoping to avoid 
another run-in with the law.44 I learned that when the officers searched 
Amadou’s perforated body for a gun, they found only a black wallet and 
a shattered beeper covered with blood.45 I learned that at least one of the 
officers wept.46 I learned facts that many Americans would not, not due 
to their apathy, but instead to sheer ignorance. After all, although 




39 Red, supra note 38; Tom Hays, NY Officers Acquitted in Diallo Case, Wash. Post (Feb. 
25, 2000, 5:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20000225/aponline-
174509_000.htm [https://perma.cc/N2XZ-NCQC]; Michael Grunwald, Immigrant Killed by 
Police Mourned, Wash. Post (Feb. 13, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/daily/feb99/bronx13.htm [https://perma.cc/9U7L-X3EM]; Heather Mac Donald, 
Diallo Truth, Diallo Falsehood, City J. (Summer 1999), https://www.city-
journal.org/html/diallo-truth-diallo-falsehood-12011.html [https://perma.cc/K7XL-VDP4].  
40 See Police Fired 41 Shots when They Killed Amadou Diallo. His Mom Hopes Today’s 
Protests Will Bring Change, CBS News (June 9, 2020, 11:11 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amadou-diallo-kadiatou-protests-george-floyd-police/ 
[https://perma.cc/5GC8-VV52].  
41 Grunwald, supra note 39. 
42 Mac Donald, supra note 39. 
43 In April 2000, Amadou Diallo’s mother and father filed a $61 million wrongful death 
lawsuit against the officers and the city. See Diallo’s Parents File $61 Million Lawsuit Against 
New York Police and City, CNN (Apr. 18, 2000), 
https://www.cnn.com/2000/US/04/18/diallo.lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/7J7H-
KNQ8]. In 2004, Kadiatou Diallo, Amadou’s mother, published a memoir about her life and 
the loss of her son. See Kadiatou Diallo & Craig Wolff, My Heart Will Cross This Ocean: My 
Story, My Son, Amadou (2004). 
44 Mac Donald, supra note 39. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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advent of Twitter and YouTube and Facebook, tools that might have 
propelled his name into the national consciousness.  
That night, lying in bed below our popcorn ceiling as the sound of the 
Six Train thumped in the distance, I realized two truths and one lie about 
my South Bronx. Truth number one: in some neighborhoods, being Black 
could get you killed for living in your American skin.47 Truth number 
two: in some neighborhoods, Black people and police officers exist in an 
inescapable Hobbesian state of nature, a world seemingly ruled by 
lawlessness, mistrust, and unchecked violence.48 Here’s the lie: my 
neighborhood was not one of those neighborhoods.  
I wanted to believe my lie, but my precocious mind had already 
deduced the logical truth about my world’s state of nature. I concluded 
that the police would be waiting outside to greet me on my way to school 
with a nod and bid me farewell on my return home with a wave. I 
concluded that in my hood, between the corner store bodega and the 
barbershop, Black men and police officers exist in a never-ending cypher 
where taunts and gibes are traded back and forth on the asphalt until 
someone takes it too far. I concluded that, in my South Bronx, fighting 
words don’t require a joke about someone’s mother or, quite frankly, any 
words at all; being Black is more than enough. 
II. THUGS AND VERY GOOD PEOPLE 
In 1989, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan declared in 
Texas v. Johnson that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of 
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
 
47 Others realized too. Bruce Springsteen wrote a song reflecting on the story of Amadou 
Diallo that later sparked controversy. See Bruce Springsteen, American Skin (41 Shots), on 
Live in New York City (Columbia Records 2001); Julian E. Barnes, Springsteen Song About 
Diallo Prompts Anger from Police, N.Y. Times (June 13, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/13/nyregion/springsteen-song-about-diallo-prompts-
anger-from-police.html [https://perma.cc/M2TR-MUH8]. Other artists similarly reflected 
upon the tragedy of Diallo’s murder. See, e.g., Wyclef Jean, Diallo, on The Ecleftic: 2 Sides 
II a Book (Columbia Records 2000) (“Have you ever been shot forty-one times? Have you 
ever screamed, and no one heard you cry? . . . Who’ll be the next to fire forty-one shots by 
Diallo’s side?”); Trivium, Contempt Breeds Contamination, on The Crusade (Roadrunner 
2006) (“The four protectors fired forty-one shots / Hitting him nineteen times / Searching the 
body, there were no weapons found / He lies with all who died in vain.”).  
48 See Raff Donelson, Blacks, Cops, and the State of Nature, 15 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 183, 
183–84 (2017).  
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disagreeable.”49 This ethic has guided a longstanding protection afforded 
to citizens who engage in public acts of protest. In response to Anti-
Federalists who sought specific guarantees of a bill of rights against the 
far reaches of national governmental power,50 James Madison drafted the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in the late eighteenth century 
as a declaration of the people’s freedom of speech, freedom to peaceably 
assemble, and freedom to petition the government.51 As a result, since 
1791, white citizens of America have been empowered to peacefully 
march and demonstrate on public lands to petition the government for 
redress of grievances. 
However, the Constitution and its Bill of Rights have maintained a 
complex relationship with Black America, beginning with the Africans 
who were enslaved as the chattel of many of the Constitution’s writers, 
and continuing with their descendants (including the Black descendants 
of the Constitution’s writers)52 who frequently live as nominally free but 
substantively second-class citizens.53 Indeed, the Constitution’s 
declaration of free speech for “We the People” was not drafted with Black 
Americans in mind; they were deemed merely three-fifths of a human 
during its passage.54 As a result, prior to the Civil War, enslaved Africans 
 
49 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).  
50 See generally Donald L. Horowtiz, The Federalist Abroad in the World, in The Federalist 
Papers 502, 509 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), 
in The Federalist Papers, supra, at 431 (describing the objection that the Constitution did not 
have a bill of rights).  
51 See Noah Feldman, James Madison’s Lessons in Racism, N.Y. Times (Oct. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/opinion/sunday/james-madison-racism.html 
[https://perma.cc/THD6-2W44]; U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).  
52 See, e.g., Annette Gordon-Reed, The Hemingses of Monticello: An American Family 24–
26 (2008). 
53 See generally Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in 
North America 12–13, 360–61 (1998) (tracing the history of slavery in the United States and 
showing that even freed slaves continued to be subject to pervasive subjugation); Nathan Irvin 
Huggins, Black Odyssey: The Afro-American Ordeal in Slavery, at xii–xiii (1977) 
(documenting slavery in America and focusing on the lived experiences of enslaved Africans); 
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 1–
2 (2012) (explaining how mass incarceration in modern America perpetuates the legacy of Jim 
Crow); Michael Kent Curtis, Reflections on Albion Tourgée’s 1896 View of the Supreme 
Court: A “Consistent Enemy of Personal Liberty and Equal Right”?, 5 Elon L. Rev. 19, 34 
(2013) (discussing the Black Codes passed by Southern states during Reconstruction). 
54 U.S. Const. pmbl.; see id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (establishing that slaves only counted as three-
fifths of a citizen for purposes of determining congressional representation). See generally 
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were prohibited from assembling for education,55 for leisure,56 for 
worship,57 or for collective expressions of dissent.58 Slave patrols, 
precursors to modern American policing that comprised “white men 
deputized to prevent rebellions by stopping any enslaved people who 
happened to be on the roads, searching them, and preventing them from 
congregating,” enforced these Slave Codes.59 When uprisings of the 
enslaved occurred, driven by a collective moral dissent to the brutal 
institution of slavery itself, Black men and Black women were met with 
lashings, lynchings, and ultimately legal holdings that sought to 
perpetuate and justify the debasement of Black lives.60  
Yet even after slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Black Codes were enacted across the United States to restrict the freedom 
 
David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification 4–5 (2009) 
(noting explicitly that the three-fifths clause applies to slaves); Feldman, supra note 51. 
55 See, e.g., An Act Respecting Slaves, Free Negroes, Mulattoes, and Mestizoes, for 
Inforcing the More Punctual Performance of Patrol Duty, and To Impose Certain Restrictions 
on the Emancipation of Slaves, 1800 S.C. Acts 36–38 (codifying “[t]hat . . . all assemblies and 
congregations of slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, and mestizoes, whether composed of all, or 
any of the above description of persons, or of all or any of the above described persons, and 
of a proportion of white persons, assembled or met together for the purpose of mental 
instruction, in a confined or secret place of meeting . . . is hereby declared to be an unlawful 
meeting . . . and the officers and persons so dispersing such unlawful assemblage of persons, 
shall, if they think proper, impose such corporal punishment, not exceeding twenty lashes, 
upon such slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, or mestizoes, as they may judge necessary for 
detering them from the like unlawful assemblages in future” (emphasis added)). 
56 See, e.g., An Act Further Declaring What Shall Be Deemed Unlawful Meetings of Slaves 
[Passed January 24, 1804], ch. 119, § 1, 1804 Va. Acts 89 (“[T]hat all meetings or assemblages 
of slaves, at any meeting house or houses, or any other place or places, in the night . . . shall 
be deemed and considered as an unlawful assembly, and any justice of the county . . . may 
issue his warrant . . . to inflict corporal punishment on the offender or offenders . . . not 
exceeding twenty lashes.”).  
57 See, e.g., An Act Concerning Free Persons of Colour, Their Guardians, and Coloured 
Preachers, § 5, 1833 Ga. Laws 226–28 (“That no person of colour, whether free or slave, shall 
be allowed to preach to, exhort or join in any religious exercise, with any persons of colour, 
either free or slave, there being more than seven persons of colour present. . . . Any free person 
of colour offending against this provision, to be liable on conviction . . . to imprisonment at 
the discretion of the court . . . . [I]f this is insufficient, he shall be sentenced to be whipped and 
imprisoned at the discretion of the court . . . .”).  
58 See, e.g., An Act To Punish the Crimes Therein Mentioned, and for Other Purposes, § 1, 
1830 La. Acts 96 (“That whosoever shall write, print, publish or distribute, any thing having 
a tendency to produce discontent among the free coloured population of the state, or 
insubordination among the slaves therein, shall . . . be sentenced to imprisonment at hard 
labour for life or suffer death, at the discretion of the court.”).  
59 See Hansford, supra note 19, at 692. 
60 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406–07 (1857). 
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of Black citizens, from restrictions on their right to assemble for leisure61 
to restrictions on their right to assemble for protest.62 Although Black 
Americans were granted access to the Constitution’s Bill of Rights during 
the Reconstruction era, the rise of racial terrorists in the form of the Ku 
Klux Klan, coupled with the refusal of law enforcement to protect Black 
lives from the Klan’s vicious acts of racial violence, stifled the First 
Amendment rights of an oppressed people.63 Not only have Critical Race 
Theorists critiqued the failure of courts to regulate “the racist message of 
segregation” and other forms of hate speech, but they have also revealed 
the subordination of Black dignity interests by courts to the freedom of 
speech interests of white supremacists.64 Accordingly, America’s modern 
system of law enforcement, as Brandon Hasbrouck explains, emerges as 
a “badge[] and incident[]” of slavery, calling into question the 
constitutionality of contemporary policing culture under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.65 From racial profiling to stop and frisk, pretextual stops, 
and the usage of excessive force—what Paul Butler has called police 
superpowers66—American policing perpetuates a system of racial 
oppression that overwhelms Black and Brown lives.67 
 
61 See, e.g., An Act To Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, § 2, 1865 Miss. Laws 90–91 
(“[A]ll freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes in this State, over the age of eighteen years, 
found on the second Monday in January, 1866, or thereafter, with no lawful employment or 
business, or found unlawfully assembling themselves together either in the day or night 
time . . . shall be deemed vagrants, and on conviction thereof, shall be fined in the sum of not 
exceeding, in the case of a freedman, free negro or mulatto, fifty dollars . . . and imprisoned 
at the discretion of the court . . . .”). 
62 See, e.g., Black Code of St. Landry’s Parish, Louisiana, 1865, in The Columbia 
Documentary History of Race and Ethnicity in America 295, 295–96 (Ronald H. Bayor ed., 
2004) (“Be it further ordained, That no negro shall be permitted to preach, exhort, or otherwise 
declaim to congregations of colored people, without a special permission in writing from the 
president of the police jury. Any negro violating the provisions of this section shall pay a fine 
of ten dollars, or in default thereof shall be forced to work ten days on the public road, or 
suffer corporeal punishment as hereinafter provided.”).  
63 See generally James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank 
(1876) Belongs at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 385, 394–405 (2014) (describing the Ku Klux Klan’s rise during Reconstruction, 
including its unchecked violence against Black Americans).   
64 Lawrence, supra note 17, at 462–66; see Hansford, supra note 19, at 693–94.  
65 Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 68 
UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 200, 217 (2020).  
66 See generally Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men 1–9 (2017) (documenting the 
extreme disparities in policing as applied to Black Americans).  
67 Hasbrouck, supra note 65, at 212–13.  
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In the age of Trump, little has changed as the constitutional rights of 
Black and Brown protestors have increasingly come under attack. 
Following the murders of several Black citizens—jogger Ahmaud Arbery 
in broad daylight after being hunted down by white vigilantes;68 George 
Floyd under the knee of a callous white police officer on suspicion of 
forgery;69 Breonna Taylor in her apartment (in the dead of the night) 
during a mistaken drug raid;70 and countless others71—frustrated and 
angry Americans have taken to the streets in cities across the country, 
from New York to Chicago to Los Angeles.72 Reminiscent of the 
uprisings that erupted after the killings of Trayvon Martin in 2012 and 
Michael Brown in 2014, tragedies that birthed the Black Lives Matter 
movement, such protesters—Black and non-Black alike—have been met 
by aggressive and violent policing tactics for affirming Black humanity, 
from tear gas to rubber bullets to vicious beatings.73 In contrast, and to 
underscore the singularity of Blackness as fighting words in the eyes of 
 
68 See Dakin Andone, Angela Barajas & Jason Morris, A Suspect in the Killing of Ahmaud 
Arbery Was Involved in a Previous Investigation of Him, Recused Prosecutor Says, CNN 
(May 9, 2020, 7:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/08/us/ahmaud-arbery-mcmichael-
arrests-friday/index.html [https://perma.cc/5T8N-NJ5N].  
69 See Erin Donaghue, Four Minneapolis Police Officers Fired After Death of Unarmed Man 
George Floyd, CBS News (May 28, 2020, 6:54 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/four-
minneapolis-police-officers-fired-george-floyd-death-video/ [https://perma.cc/JH5Z-FG8U]. 
70 See Darcy Costello & Tessa Duvall, Who Was Breonna Taylor? What We Know About 
the Louisville ER Tech Fatally Shot by Police, Courier J. (May 12, 2020, 6:25 AM), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2020/05/12/breonna-taylor-case-what-
know-louisville-emt-killed-cops/3110066001/ [https://perma.cc/398F-KXW8]. 
71 See Mohammed Haddad, Mapping US Police Killings of Black Americans, Al Jazeera 
(May 31, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2020/05/mapping-police-
killings-black-americans-200531105741757.html [https://perma.cc/M6L7-US28] (“The 
number of police killings in the US disproportionately affects African Americans. Despite 
only making up 13 percent of the US population, Black Americans are two-and-a-half times 
as likely as white Americans to be killed by the police.”).  
72 See Richard Luscombe, Chris McGreal, Sam Levin, Julia Carrie Wong & David Smith, 
George Floyd: Protests and Unrest Coast to Coast as US Cities Impose Curfews, Guardian 
(May 31, 2020, 3:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/30/george-floyd-
protests-saturday-curfews-minneapolis [https://perma.cc/EYR4-UKBF]. 
73 See generally Barbara Ransby, Making All Black Lives Matter: Reimagining Freedom in 
the Twenty-First Century 5–6 (2018) (tracing the origins of the Black Lives Matter 
movement); Jennifer E. Cobbina, Hands Up, Don’t Shoot: Why the Protests in Ferguson and 
Baltimore Matter, and How They Changed America 2–3 (2019) (describing the uprisings in 
Ferguson and Baltimore); Hansford, supra note 19, at 690 (“For example, antiracist protesters 
from Selma to Ferguson to Mizzou have generally faced harsh sanctions through the use of 
tear gas, tanks, physical threats, and economic threats.”). 
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police officers, white protestors decrying racial justice activism are often 
met with law enforcement support.74 
To be sure, one could argue that Donald Trump’s presidency has 
merely perpetuated the militarization of policing that followed the 
uprising in Ferguson, Missouri, after the killing of Michael Brown, 
perhaps part and parcel of Trump’s authoritarian yet fundamentally 
neoliberal panache.75 However, since Trump’s election, a surge of anti-
protest legislation has been passed in various states that empower police 
to arrest people for encouraging “violence” through traditionally 
protected forms of speech.76 Although first introduced during the Obama 
administration, before President Trump took office, these bills have 
become increasingly commonplace since Trump’s inauguration. Further, 
President Trump has endeavored to cement Black identity—whether 
evoked by public speech or embodied by free assembly—as a kind of 
unprotected free speech. Indeed, the violent police responses to Black 
Lives Matter activists, whom President Trump referred to as “THUGS,”77 
stand in sharp contrast to the relatively passive law enforcement response 
to armed right-wing protestors during COVID-19’s anti-lockdown 
 
74 See, e.g., Mara Hvistendahl & Alleen Brown, Armed Vigilantes Antagonizing Protesters 
Have Received a Warm Reception from Police, Intercept (June 19, 2020, 1:55 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2020/06/19/militia-vigilantes-police-brutality-protests/ 
[https://perma.cc/J56B-XXBX]; Jack Brewster, Report: Trump Officials Were Directed To 
Defend Kyle Rittenhouse Publicly, Documents Show, Forbes (Oct. 1, 2020, 10:20 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackbrewster/2020/10/01/report-trump-officials-were-directed-
to-defend-kyle-rittenhouse-publicly-documents-show/#2b19c84f6eeb [https://perma.cc/5D-
HB-JG45] (“Department of Homeland Security officials were told to express public comments 
that would portray Kyle Rittenhouse—the 17-year-old charged with shooting three people, 
two of them fatally, at a protest during a standoff between militia members and protesters in 
Kenosha, Wisconsin—in a positive light . . . .”).  
75 See Eliav Lieblich & Adam Shinar, Police Militarization in the Trump Era, Just Sec. (Feb. 
1, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37125/police-militarization-trump-era/ [https://perma.-
cc/F3RA-KNBS]; Jonathan Chait, Trump Is Failing at Governing but Winning at 
Authoritarianism, N.Y. Mag. (May 20, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/-
05/trump-authoritarian-democracy-barr-justice.html.  
76 Olivia Rosane, 3 States Pass Anti-pipeline Protest Bills in Two Weeks, EcoWatch (Mar. 
30, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://www.ecowatch.com/anti-pipeline-protest-bills-
2645583954.html?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1 [https://perma.cc/TE52-EE9A]; Alleen Brown, 
A Powerful Petrochemical Lobbying Group Advanced Anti-protest Legislation in the Midst 
of the Pandemic, Intercept (June 7, 2020, 9:11 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/07/-
pipeline-petrochemical-lobbying-group-anti-protest-law/ [https://perma.cc/G3D5-UCUM]. 
77 Nick Visser, Trump Calls George Floyd Protesters ‘THUGS,’ Threatens Violent 
Intervention in Minneapolis, Huffington Post (May 29, 2020, 3:03 AM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-minneapolis-thugs-george-floyd_n_5ed0a6cac5b6eb-
d583bed6be?guccounter=2 [https://perma.cc/2GHU-EJYB].  
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demonstrations, whom President Trump called “very good people.”78 
During the summer of 2020, the Trump administration introduced 
policing tactics in response to peaceful BLM protests, including the 
emergence of secret police employed by the Department of Homeland 
Security who refuse to identify themselves, snatch protestors off the 
street, detain protestors in unmarked vans without issuing formal charges, 
and drive protestors to undisclosed locations to further undisclosed 
ends.79 And most recently, during 2020’s first presidential debate, 
President Trump ignored a request to publicly decry the Proud Boys, a 
white supremacist right-wing militia group, stating instead, “Proud Boys? 
Stand back and stand by.”80 Simply put, the Trump era transcends the 
neoliberal politics of days past in ways that frighten ordinary sensibilities.  
III. FREE SPEECH AND FIGHTING WORDS 
Perhaps it is important to remember that the rights granted by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution are not unconditional. Certainly, James 
Madison argued against the narrow conception of free speech and 
assembly that existed under English law.81 Under the British Riot Act of 
 
78 Caleb Ecarma, Of Course Trump Called Armed, Right-Wing Protesters “Very Good 
People”, Vanity Fair (May 1, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/05/donald-
trump-called-armed-right-wing-protesters-good-people [https://perma.cc/DFH2-5KWK]; see 
Dartunorro Clark, Hundreds of Protesters, Some Carrying Guns in the State Capitol, 
Demonstrate Against Michigan’s Emergency Measures, NBC News (Apr. 30, 2020, 3:30 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/hundreds-protest-michigan-lawmakers-
consider-extending-governors-emergency-powers-n1196886 [https://perma.cc/23DP-
KA5Y]; see also T.C. Sottek, Caught on Camera, Police Explode in Rage and Violence Across 
the US, Verge (May 31, 2020, 11:46 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/31/2127-
6044/police-violence-protest-george-floyd. 
79 See Igor Derysh, “They’re Kidnapping People”: “Trump’s Secret Police” Snatch Portland 
Protesters into Unmarked Vans, Salon (July 17, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.salon.com/-
2020/07/17/theyre-kidnapping-people-trumps-secret-police-snatch-portland-protesters-into-
unmarked-vans/ [https://perma.cc/7BMB-VBWG]; David A. Graham, America Gets an 
Interior Ministry, Atlantic (July 21, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/-
2020/07/americas-interior-ministry/614389/ [https://perma.cc/3LST-VL5U]; Jonathan 
Levinson & Conrad Wilson, Federal Law Enforcement Use Unmarked Vehicles To Grab 
Protesters off Portland Streets, OPB (July 16, 2020, 5:45 PM), https://www.opb.org/news/-
article/federal-law-enforcement-unmarked-vehicles-portland-protesters/ 
[https://perma.cc/4NNS-F5RK]. 
80 Caleb Ecarma, Trump’s Proud Boys “Stand By” Debate Moment Is Snowballing, Vanity 
Fair (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/09/donald-trump-proud-boys-
debate-moment-snowballing [https://perma.cc/4YAS-TBGN].  
81 See generally Wendell Bird, Press and Speech Under Assault: The Early Supreme Court 
Justices, the Sedition Act of 1798, and the Campaign Against Dissent, at xxi (2016) 
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1714, groups of twelve people or more could be forcefully dispersed, even 
to the point of death, if deemed to be “unlawfully, riotously, and 
tumultuously assembled together.”82 While elements of the British Riot 
Act were incorporated into the Militia Acts enacted by the second United 
States Congress in 1792 to enable the president to suppress insurrections 
during a time of frequent social unrest,83 the Supreme Court affirmed free 
speech principles in Edwards v. South Carolina (1963), declaring:  
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite 
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a 
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, 
or even stirs people to anger. . . . There is no room under our 
Constitution for a more restrictive view.84  
Whereas the Federalist Party of President John Adams enacted the 
Sedition Act in 1798 to ban speech directed at overthrowing the 
government,85 the Supreme Court maintained in Brandenburg v. Ohio 
(1969) that such speech is protected by the First Amendment, so long as 
it is not “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and 
 
(describing the history of the limited conception of free speech under English common law); 
Michael Kahn, The Origination and Early Development of Free Speech in the United States—
A Brief Overview, 76 Fla. Bar J. 71, 72–73 (2002) (mentioning James Madison’s expansive 
initial draft of the First Amendment); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 
18, 1800), in 6 The Writings of James Madison, 1790–1802, at 347, 384–87 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 1906) (writing how the narrow British conception of free speech is incompatible with the 
nascent American democracy).  
82 The Riot Act 1714, 1 Geo. c.5, § 1.  
83 The Riot Act of 1714, entitled An Act for Preventing Tumults and Riotous Assemblies, 
and for the More Speedy and Effectual Punishing the Rioters, was passed by the Parliament 
of Great Britain to respond to “many rebellious riots and tumults” and disturbances of the 
peace that were deemed to “alienate the affections of the people from his Majesty.” Id.; see 
also id. (“That if any persons to the number of twelve or more, being unlawfully, riotously, 
and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the publick peace . . . and being 
required or commanded by any one or more justice or justices of the peace . . . to disperse 
themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations . . . remain or continue together by the 
space of one hour after such command or request made by proclamation . . . shall suffer death 
as in case of felony without benefit of clergy.”). The First Militia Act of 1792, entitled Act To 
Provide for Calling Forth the Militia, To Execute the Laws of Union, Suppress Insurrections, 
and Repel Invasions, similarly granted the President the power to issue a proclamation “in 
case of an insurrection in any state . . . [to] command such insurgents to disperse, and retire 
peaceably to their respective abodes, within a limited time.” Act To Provide for Calling Forth 
the Militia, To Execute the Laws of Union, Suppress Insurrections, and Repel Invasions, ch. 
28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795).  
84 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949)). 
85 See Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
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is not “likely to incite or produce such action.”86 However, while the 
federal government cannot generally regulate speech based on its content, 
it can enact reasonable, content-neutral restrictions on its time, place, and 
manner.87 Additionally, some categories of speech are given limited or no 
protection under the First Amendment.88 For example, some kinds of 
speech are considered so harmful, so injurious by themselves, their very 
utterance tending to incite an immediate retaliation or breach of the peace, 
that they are deemed outside of the Constitution’s protection. Such words 
are called “fighting words.”89  
The fighting-words doctrine originated in 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire.90 Mr. Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, drew several 
complaints from the residents of Rochester, New Hampshire, after 
defaming various religious sects while proselytizing. After calling the city 
marshal “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist,” Chaplinsky 
was arrested and convicted under a state law that made it a crime to 
“address any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any other person 
who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any 
offensive or derisive name.”91 Chaplinsky appealed his conviction and 
challenged the law, arguing that the city ordinance violated his freedom 
 
86 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969). 
87 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 787, 796 (1989) (holding that a 
requirement to use sound amplification equipment and a sound technician provided by the city 
due to persistent noise complaints from nearby residents was a content-neutral and reasonable 
regulation of the place and manner of protected speech); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 377 (1968) (upholding a restriction on expressive content and demonstrating that content-
neutral restrictions may be upheld when the government has a compelling interest). The time, 
place, and manner restrictions imposed on the freedom to speak and assemble differ based 
upon the nature of the speaker’s chosen forum, which the Supreme Court has divided into 
three categories: traditional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums. 
When reviewing the constitutionality of government restrictions on speech in public and 
designated forums, courts use strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, restrictions on free speech 
must further a “compelling state interest” and must be narrowly tailored to meet the goals of 
that interest. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).  
88 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood 
that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment 
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words.”). 
89 Id. at 572. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 569. But see Robert M. O’Neil, Rights in Conflict: The First Amendment’s Third 
Century, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 17 (2002) (noting that Mr. Chaplinsky “maintained 
that he had firmly but politely informed the officer that ‘You, sir, are damned in the eyes of 
God’ and ‘no better than a racketeer’”).  
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of speech under the First Amendment.92 However, in a unanimous 
opinion, the Supreme Court held that Chaplinsky’s “fighting words” 
incited an immediate breach of the peace,93 and consequently, they were 
deemed unprotected speech under the First Amendment’s freedom of 
speech clause.94 Rather than evoking the Holmesian marketplace of 
ideas,95 the Court instead considered Chaplinsky’s words “of such slight 
social value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them [was] 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”96 As the 
Court explained, Chaplinsky’s epithets were “likely to provoke the 
average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.”97  
Although Chaplinsky has never been overruled, the Supreme Court 
narrowed its scope in later decisions. For example, in 1949 in Terminiello 
v. Chicago, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Mr. 
Terminiello, an ex-Catholic priest who had been convicted of breach of 
the peace after delivering an anti-Semitic speech to the Christian Veterans 
of America.98 The Supreme Court reasoned that not only was the city 
ordinance not limited to unprotected fighting words, but it also considered 
whether Terminiello had invited dispute or brought about conditions of 
unrest, rendering the ordinance overly broad.99 Justice Douglas famously 
declared that “a function of free speech under our system of government 
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it 
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to anger.”100   
The Court reached a similar result in 1971, at the height of the Vietnam 
War. In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court overturned the 
conviction of Paul Cohen for disturbing the peace in violation of 
 
92 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. 
93 See id. at 573–74.  
94 See Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its 
Interment, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1129, 1129–30 (1993). 
95 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But 
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground 
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”).  
96 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  
97 Id. at 574. 
98 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 1–3, 6 (1949).  
99 See id. at 4–5. 
100 Id. at 4.  
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California law by wearing a jacket displaying the words “Fuck the Draft” 
in a Los Angeles courthouse.101 The Court noted that the words on 
Cohen’s jacket were not a direct personal insult aimed at a specific person 
and thus could not be deemed fighting words.102 Justice Harlan 
concluded, “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. . . . [T]he Constitution 
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.”103 Some 
argue that an underlying tension between Chaplinsky and Cohen—the 
former punishing public vulgarities and the latter allowing them—has 
bred confusion on “defining the line between protected speech and 
unprotected epithets.”104 Nevertheless, the fighting-words doctrine has 
repeatedly been invoked in state courts, particularly following 
tempestuous encounters between citizens and the police.105 
IV. POLICE OFFICERS AND BLACK BODIES 
In matters involving public protests toward the perceived racist actions 
of police officers, the fighting-words doctrine raises important questions 
about the limits of constitutional protection for Black and Brown citizens. 
Cases like Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974) and City of Houston v. 
Hill (1987), which both overturned convictions based upon local laws 
prohibiting the interruption of policing work with offensive language,106 
 
101 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
102  See id. at 20. 
103  Id. at 25. 
104  O’Neil, supra note 91, at 16.  
105  See infra note 106. 
106 City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 451 (1987); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 
U.S. 130, 130 (1974); see also Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2013) (flashing 
“the finger” at a police officer not deemed probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest); 
Posr v. Court Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating to a police officer, 
“One day you’re gonna get yours,” unaccompanied by any other action, would not rise to the 
level of fighting words); Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1990) (calling 
a police officer an “asshole” did not constitute fighting words); Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 
F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1990) (delivering rude gestures and cursing at a police officer in 
Spanish not deemed fighting words); R.I.T. v. State, 675 So. 2d 97, 100 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1995) (uttering “fuck you” to a police officer did not rise to the level of fighting words); In re. 
Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 419–20 (Minn. 1978) (reversing conviction for yelling to 
police, “fuck you pigs”); Brendle v. City of Houston, 759 So. 2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2000) (reversing conviction for violating statute prohibiting “public profanity” by 
stating, “I’m tired of this God d––– police sticking their nose in s––– that doesn’t even involve 
them”); Harrington v. City of Tulsa, 763 P.2d 700, 700–02 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (reversing 
conviction of defendant who stated to police officers, “You’re such an ass” and “You mother 
f—ers, you can’t—you’re not brave enough to go out and catch murders and robbers. You are 
a couple of pussies”).  
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affirm a sense that “the First Amendment protects a significant amount of 
verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.”107 In fact, many 
courts have argued that police officers should be held to a higher standard 
when exercising their policing power against those merely speaking. In 
Marttila v. City of Lynchburg (2000), a Virginia Court of Appeals 
overturned the conviction of a defendant who called police officers 
“fucking pigs” and indicated they “should be at a fucking donut shop.”108 
The court declared that “the First Amendment requires properly trained 
police officers to exercise a higher degree of restraint when confronted by 
disorderly conduct and abusive language.”109   
Some state and local governments have responded to such concerns by 
simply limiting the range of public speech that can be criminalized to only 
include “fighting words,” effectively granting police officers 
discretionary authority to determine what kinds of activities or public 
speech amount to criminal conduct. In other words, legislatures have 
bypassed wrestling with the underlying racial tensions between law 
enforcement and minoritized communities by avoiding acknowledging 
the prevalence of implicit racial bias among police officers altogether.110 
Rather than question why police officers routinely use pepper spray, tear 
gas, rubber bullets, and other violent policing tactics in response to 
peaceful public protest about racial injustice, the doctrine threatens to 
punish people who anger police officers with their free speech.111 As a 
 
107 Hill, 482 U.S. at 461. 
108 535 S.E.2d 693, 693, 695 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).  
109  Id. at 697–98 n.5. 
110  See Lois James, The Stability of Implicit Racial Bias in Police Officers, 21 Police Q. 30, 
47 (2018) (demonstrating through empirical analysis that “[a]lthough officers did tend to 
either moderately or strongly associate Black Americans with weapons, implicit racial bias 
varied significantly within the same officers over time,” which “suggests that implicit racial 
bias is not a stable trait . . . [and] training designed to reduce bias is not doomed to failure”). 
111  Sottek, supra note 78 (noting several examples of police brutality: “A New York City 
police officer tore a protective mask off of a young black man and assaulted him with pepper 
spray while the victim peacefully stood with his hands up[.] . . . San Antonio Police used tear 
gas against people. So did Dallas police. So did Los Angeles police. So did DC 
police. . . . MSNBC host Ali Velshi says he was shot after state police fired unprovoked into 
a peaceful rally”); Black Lives Matter Protests: Mapping Police Violence Across the USA, 
Amnesty Int’l, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/usa-unlawful-use-of-force-
by-police-at-black-lives-matter-protests/ [https://perma.cc/TFB2-PU6T] (“Amnesty 
International has documented 125 separate incidents of police violence against protesters in 
40 states and the District of Columbia between 26 May and 5 June 2020. These acts of 
excessive force were committed by members of state and local police departments, as well as 
by National Guard troops and security force personnel from several federal agencies.”). 
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result, a sense of confusion remains, especially regarding public speech 
that decries racism at the hands of the police. Could the phrase “Black 
Lives Matter” and similar expressions that either affirm the dignity of 
Black lives or decry the injustice of institutional racism be deemed 
“fighting words” by police officers? 
Some courts have held that public expressions of dissent to law 
enforcement can constitute fighting words.112 For example, in State v. 
Clay (1999), the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for 
disorderly conduct under Minnesota law based upon “fighting words” 
directed toward police officers.113 Minnesota police officers identified 
Nathan Webb Clay as a suspect in a local fight.114 After approaching and 
questioning Mr. Clay, the suspect proceeded to call one officer a “white 
racist motherf**ker” and accused another of racism before telling both 
officers “that he wished their mothers would die.”115 The officers arrested 
Clay, and the district court found him guilty of disorderly conduct.116 The 
court of appeals examined whether Clay’s speech, viewed in light of the 
surrounding circumstances (including the fact that it was Mother’s Day 
weekend), would likely provoke retaliatory violence by police officers.117 
The court ultimately held that Clay’s speech did in fact rise to the level of 
fighting words, stating that “appellant’s language was directed at the 
officers and was not merely the expression of a controversial opinion; 
while calling the officers ‘white racist motherf**kers’ may be protected, 
wishing death upon an officer’s mother is not.”118  
Critical Race Theorists have argued that such tensions in the 
implications of verbal expressions between officers and citizens reflect 
“the cultural structures of masculinity in the contemporary Anglo-
 
112  See, e.g., State v. Griatzky, 587 A.2d 234, 238 (Me. 1991) (holding that “abusive 
language challenging the officer’s authority and implicitly exhorting the assembled group to 
join in that challenge and to resist the order to disperse . . . presented a clear and present danger 
of an immediate breach of the peace even when directed toward a police officer”); State v. 
York, 732 A.2d 859, 861–62 (Me. 1999) (holding that calling court security officers “fucking 
assholes” and preparing to spit on the officer would “have a direct tendency to cause a violent 
response by an ordinary person”). 
113  See State v. Clay, No. CX-99-343, 1999 WL 711038, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 
1999) (“The district court found that . . . the appellant’s words were sufficiently egregious to 
provoke retaliatory police violence.”).  
114  See id. at *1.  
115  Id.  
116  See id.  
117  See id. at *2–3.  
118  Id. at *3. 
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American world,” causing “[m]en disempowered by racial or class status” 
to seek “ways of proving their manhood,” in some instances with 
violence.119 According to Angela P. Harris, among the men who 
predominate crime, criminal justice, and policing, “violent acts 
are . . . sometimes[] the result of the character of masculinity itself as a 
cultural ideal . . . [where] men use violence or the threat of 
violence . . . when they perceive their masculine self-identity to be under 
attack.”120 Some scholars argue that such identity performance theories of 
American masculinity find roots in the “culture of honor” among white 
males in the American South,121 where an “ethic of self-protection” 
among early frontier herdsmen in an atmosphere of lawlessness made it 
“important to establish one’s reputation for toughness—even on matters 
that might seem small on the surface.”122   
Such “culture-of-honor norms” are not only embodied in the laws and 
public policies of the American South,123 but they have also influenced 
police departments across the country. Law enforcement officers who 
pledge an oath of honor often enact a “hypermasculine” cultural image of 
policing embodied by the man who is “tough and violent, yet heroic, 
protective, and necessary to society’s very survival.”124 As Frank Rudy 
Cooper further explains, the working-class status of many male police 
officers catalyzes their hypermasculinity with efforts to mitigate their 
subordinate class status through aggressive, authoritative, and even 
violent policing.125  
 
119  Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 777, 
780 (2000).  
120  Id. at 781. 
121  Dov Cohen, Richard E. Nisbett, Brian F. Bowdle & Norbert Schwarz, Insult, Aggression, 
and the Southern Culture of Honor: An “Experimental Ethnography”, 70 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psych. 945, 946 (1996) (“White male homicide rates of the South are higher than those of the 
North, and the South exceeds the North only in homicides that are argument- or conflict-
related, not in homicides that are committed while another felony, such as robbery or burglary, 
is being performed. Such findings are consistent with a stronger emphasis on honor and 
protection in the South.”). 
122  Id. at 946; see also id. (“In the Old South, allowing oneself to be pushed around or 
affronted without retaliation amounted to admitting that one was an easy mark and could be 
taken advantage of.”).  
123  Id.; see also id. (this culture is “reflected in looser gun control laws, less restrictive self-
defense statutes, and more hawkish voting by federal legislators on foreign policy issues”).  
124  See Harris, supra note 119, at 793.  
125  Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police 
Training, 18 Colum. J. Gender & L. 671, 691–92 (2009); Harris, supra note 119, at 794 (“Beat 
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One might conclude that it was therefore a performative culture of 
hypermasculinity that provoked the police officers in Clay, and not the 
underlying racial tensions stoked by Mr. Clay’s proclamation that the 
officers were “white racist motherf**kers.”126 Perhaps yelling “yo mama” 
to a police officer, or in Mr. Clay’s case, calling for an officer’s mother’s 
death, should appropriately be deemed fighting words because “street 
policing is deeply steeped in a masculine culture” and “violence is always 
just below the surface.”127 However, Angela P. Harris argues that racial, 
ethnic, and class divides trigger different expressions of masculinity that 
reflect power struggles among men and mediate conflicts in social life.128 
Policing—even when characterized by expressions of hypermasculinity 
—“follows the vectors of power established in the larger society in which 
white dominates nonwhite and rich dominates poor.”129 Further, “the 
instability of masculine identity,” due to a racialized yet amorphous 
societal power structure, renders the prospect of violence between citizens 
and police as an ever-present defense mechanism.130 Accordingly, 
clarifying when anti-racist speech that provokes retaliatory violence 
should be protected, and when such speech should be viewed as mere 
contestations of gender performativity, would help to make sense of the 
racial coordinates that comprise society’s vectors of power. 
By ignoring these underlying questions of agency and ascription in 
racial identity—how one chooses to perform their racial and gender 
identity versus how their identity performance is perceived—courts have 
published seemingly inconsistent conclusions about the meaning of 
fighting words. Unlike Clay, some courts have held expressions of dissent 
 
cops tend to be working-class men, men denied the masculinity of wealth, power, and order 
giving.”).  
126 State v. Clay, No. CX-99-343, 1999 WL 711038, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1999).  
127 Harris, supra note 119, at 794, 796. 
128 See id. at 784 (“The relations between white and black men, then, are more complex than 
‘dominant’ and ‘subordinate’; men divided by racial power may look at one another with 
admiration, envy, or desire.”). 
129 Id. at 797. 
130  Camille Gear Rich, Angela Harris and the Racial Politics of Masculinity: Trayvon 
Martin, George Zimmerman, and the Dilemmas of Desiring Whiteness, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 
1027, 1039 (2014); see Harris, supra note 119, at 788 (“Men must constantly defend 
themselves against both women and other men in order to be accepted as men; their gender 
identity, crucial to their psychological sense of wholeness, is constantly in doubt. . . . [U]nder 
these circumstances, gender performance frequently becomes gender violence.”). 
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to law enforcement during policing encounters tinged by acts of racial 
bias as not constituting fighting words.131 
In the case of Johnson v. Campbell (2003), the Third Circuit reversed 
a lower court’s finding that the arrest of an African American man for 
disorderly conduct was constitutional.132 Mr. Steven Johnson was a high 
school basketball coach who was staying in a motel with his team in 
Delaware before the start of a tournament.133 Johnson was reported to 
Delaware police by a motel employee for flipping through free 
newspapers in the motel’s guest office.134 The employee explained that 
Mr. Johnson made her nervous because the motel had been robbed five 
months prior by two young Black men.135 According to the employee, 
“the way [Mr. Johnson] was walking and pacing around the office and his 
body language” scared her.136 Upon arrival, a police officer located Mr. 
Johnson reading a newspaper inside of a parked car outside of the motel 
and attempted to detain him.137 Mr. Johnson did not comply with requests 
to show identification, and after calling the police officer a “son of a 
bitch,” Mr. Johnson was placed under arrest for his use of profane 
language and disturbance of the peace.138 The court of appeals held that 
Mr. Johnson’s constitutional rights had been violated because his words 
did not amount to fighting words, explaining that “Johnson’s words were 
unpleasant, insulting, and possibly unwise, but they were not intended to, 
nor did they, cause a fight.”139  
 
131  See, e.g., Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the 
plaintiff “brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the arresting officer, Officer Erik 
Campbell, asserting that Campbell had violated his constitutional rights by detaining and 
arresting him without cause and due to his race”); Cornelious v. Brubaker, No. 
01CV1254,2003 WL 21511125, at *2, *9 (D. Minn. June 25, 2003) (after yelling “‘fuck you 
all’ to Officer Brubaker and Anaya, who were across the street from him[,] . . . Cornelious 
was called a ‘nigger’ while he was hit and kicked on the ground by Officer Brubaker, Gardner, 
and Anaya”); United States v. McDermott, 971 F. Supp. 939, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Brendle v. 
City of Houston, 759 So. 2d 1274, 1284 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).  
132  Johnson, 332 F.3d at 215; see also id. at 213 (explaining that “swear words, spoken to a 
police officer, do not provide probable cause for an arrest for disorderly conduct because the 
words, as a matter of law, are not ‘fighting words’”).  
133  See id. at 201–02. 
134  See id. at 202. 
135  See id.  
136  Id.  
137  See id. at 203.  
138  Id.  
139  Id. at 213–15.  
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The difficulty that courts have faced in determining whether the 
Constitution protects public protests of perceived racist policing suggests 
that the notion of anti-racist speech as fighting words is still up for debate. 
Perhaps one reason for such ambiguity arises from the very concept of 
disorderly conduct, an inherently racially biased idea.140 In many Black 
and Brown communities, police supervision has become a part of 
everyday life, whether employed to threaten misbehaving students in 
school,141 marginalize Black girls in the classroom,142 or reprimand 
homeless people sleeping on the street.143 As Paul Gowder explains, 
citizen acts that undermine the command mode of police authority—or 
the social order—become a threat to order-maintenance policing—or an 
instance of social disorder.144 When anti-racist speech threatens the 
commonplace nature of police supervisory authority—even when 
delivered in response to unjustified, yet ubiquitous, police aggression—it 
is reasonable to presume that police officers will perceive such language 
as “fighting words” that incite an immediate breach of the hierarchical 
social order. 
Another reason for the ambiguity of anti-racist speech as fighting 
words arises from the criminalization of disobedience to police orders. 
Not only do citizens struggle to determine when policing tactics are 
 
140  See Jamelia N. Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 20) (on file with author).  
141  See Julie Kiernan Coon & Lawrence F. Travis III, The Role of Police in Public Schools: 
A Comparison of Principal and Police Reports of Activities in Schools, 13 Police Prac. & 
Rsch. 15, 18 (2012); Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 919, 922 (2016) (“For example, police officers stationed at schools have 
arrested students for texting, passing gas in class, violating the school dress code, stealing two 
dollars from a classmate, bringing a cell phone to class, arriving late to school, or telling 
classmates waiting in the school lunch line that he would ‘get them’ if they ate all of the 
potatoes.”).  
142  See Erica L. Green, Mark Walker & Eliza Shapiro, ‘A Battle for the Souls of Black 
Girls’, N.Y. Times (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/us/politics/black-
girls-school-discipline.html [https://perma.cc/Y4AT-7UQH] (“A New York Times analysis 
of the most recent discipline data from the Education Department found that Black girls are 
over five times more likely than white girls to be suspended at least once from school, seven 
times more likely to receive multiple out-of-school suspensions than white girls and three 
times more likely to receive referrals to law enforcement.”).  
143  See Maria Foscarinis, Kelly Cunningham-Bowers & Kristen E. Brown, Out of Sight—
Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 Geo. J. 
on Poverty L. & Pol’y 145, 146–47 (1999).  
144 See Gowder, supra note 25, at 13–14. 
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lawful,145 but they also face the risk of bodily harm, or even worse, death, 
if they disobey a police order to challenge perceived unlawful conduct.146 
Further, civil rights lawsuits alleging violations of constitutional rights by 
police officers must confront the blue wall of silence,147 the weaponry of 
indemnification policies148 and police unions,149 and the protective shield 
of the qualified-immunity defense.150 The doctrine of qualified immunity 
protects police officers from suit unless the aggrieved party can show that 
the officer violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable [police officer] would have known.”151 Following 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pearson v. Callahan (2009), which held 
that courts can first decide whether a constitutional right was “clearly 
established” at the time of the alleged misconduct before determining 
whether the alleged facts constitute a violation of a constitutional right,152 
it seems that courts can simply rule that a police officer did not violate a 
“clearly established” constitutional right by arresting a citizen for anti-
racist speech that disturbs the peace. If courts dismiss a suit on such 
grounds, the underlying question of whether such anti-racist speech is 
protected under the First Amendment remains unresolved. 
Put another way, when investigating police officer liability for a 
claimed violation of First Amendment rights, courts do not have to 
resolve whether anti-racist speech unjustifiably become “fighting words” 
 
145  Orin Kerr, Sandra Bland and the ‘Lawful Order’ Problem, Wash. Post (July 23, 2015, 
11:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/23/san-
dra-bland-and-the-lawful-order-problem/ [https://perma.cc/WM4K-GGG8].  
146  See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 315–16 (2016).  
147  See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias 
and Motive To Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 233, 237–40 (1998). 
148  See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 890 (2014) 
(“Police officers are virtually always indemnified.”). 
149  See Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 712, 
747–58 (2017).  
150  See, e.g., Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
defendant officer was entitled to qualified immunity because his violation of the plaintiff’s 
First Amendment constitutional rights was a “reasonable mistake”); Carbado, supra note 22, 
at 1519–23. 
151  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Some argue that such protections trace 
their origin to the Casual Killing Act of 1669, a Virginia law that exempted slave masters and 
those under their instruction from the charge of murder, if their slaves were killed during the 
administration of extreme punishment, because malice could not be presumed. See An Act 
About the Casuall Killing of Slaves, in 2 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the 
Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619, at 270, 270 
(William Waller Hening ed., 1823).  
152  555 U.S. 223, 244–45 (2009).  
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in the minds of officers who suppress such speech or retaliate with 
violence. Courts can simply assert that anti-racist protest speech is not a 
clearly established form of protected speech under the Constitution 
because some citizens, including some police officers, might reasonably 
interpret them—e.g., protestors shouting “Black Lives Matter”—as 
harmful words that provoke an immediate breach of the peace. To be sure, 
a rich legacy of white supremacist ideology woven into the fabric of 
American culture underscores the “reasonableness” of perceiving anti-
racist pure speech—spoken or written words—as a threat to the status 
quo, especially a status quo typified by order-maintenance policing. Even 
more, history reveals that the unconstrained Black body in the public 
square is often perceived as a threat to white supremacy, rendering 
Blackness itself a kind of symbolic speech that becomes “fighting words” 
in the minds of some citizens. The caricature of the Black American man 
as a “brute” provides but one example. 
While enslaved Africans were typically portrayed as childlike and 
docile to assuage the moral angst of their white masters, free Black 
citizens were thought to be driven by animalistic tendencies and savage 
instincts. Not only were Black Americans after the abolition of slavery 
characterized as “lazy, thriftless, intemperate, insolent, dishonest, and 
without the most rudimentary elements of morality,”153 but Black men in 
particular were deemed brutes—a man “lurking in the dark, a monstrous 
beast, crazed with lust. His ferocity is almost demoniacal.”154 In fact, the 
claim that Black men were brutally raping white women was used to 
justify their torture and lynching during the Reconstruction era and well 
into the twentieth century. According to Barbara Holden-Smith, victims 
of public lynching by mobs “were tied to trees and while the funeral pyres 
were being prepared, they were forced to hold out their hands while one 
finger at a time was chopped off. The fingers were distributed as 
souvenirs.”155  
The racist culture of characterizing Black men as criminal and savage 
brutes to justify their harsh treatment and public lynching persists to this 
 
153  Thomas Nelson Page, The Negro: The Southerner’s Problem 80 (1910).  
154  George T. Winston, The Relations of the Whites to the Negroes, 18 Annals Am. Acad. 
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 105, 109 (1901). 
155  Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender 
in the Progressive Era, 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 31, 31 (1996) (quoting Lynched Negro and 
Wife Were First Mutilated, Vicksburg (Miss.) Evening Post, Feb. 8, 1904, in Ralph Ginzburg, 
100 Years of Lynching 62–63 (1969)). 
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day. For example, in 2014, Officer Darren Wilson described the eighteen-
year-old Michael Brown as a superhuman “demon” that looked 
“aggressive” and “hostile” to clarify why he shot the Black teenager after 
Brown had been suspected of stealing a box of Swisher Sweets from a 
convenience store.156 Perhaps Brown’s unconstrained and dignified Black 
body became symbolic speech in defiance of Wilson’s command mode of 
police authority and consequently was deemed a threat to Wilson’s social 
status.157 Is it no wonder that Amadou Diallo was shot at forty-one times 
on suspicion of rape without uttering a single word?158 
Perhaps this line of reasoning has an atmosphere of conjecture. After 
all, charges for crimes like disturbing the police, interfering with public 
officials, or inciting a riot are rarely decided by invoking the fighting-
words doctrine. But maybe the threat of conviction for speaking one’s 
mind is more than enough to sustain the racial status quo. Why else would 
Black and Brown parents teach their children to passively comply with 
police officer demands, even in the face of racially biased, aggressive, and 
supervisory behavior?159 Why else would so many Black and Brown 
Americans avoid the police altogether, even when the police are Black?160 
As Vesla Weaver explains, the prospect of being reprimanded for 
peaceful protests against unlawful police behavior turns the criminal 
justice system into “a site of racial learning” where minoritized citizens 
are socialized into the extant racial social order.161 Unfortunately, when 
citizens remain silent to racist policing out of fear for their safety, they 
 
156 Jamelle Bouie, Michael Brown Wasn’t a Superhuman Demon, Slate (Nov. 26, 2014, 
12:07 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/11/darren-wilsons-racial-portrayal-of-
michael-brown-as-a-superhuman-demon-the-ferguson-police-officers-account-is-a-common-
projection-of-racial-fears.html [https://perma.cc/6H33-2F56] (quoting Wilson’s grand jury 
testimony and his interview with police). 
157  As Angela P. Harris explains, the stereotypical savage Black male can be perceived as a 
threat to the masculinity of white police officers. See Harris, supra note 119, at 798–99. 
158  New York City is no stranger to the culture of violent policing of Black and Brown 
citizens. See, e.g., Marilynn Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in New 
York City 18–19 (2003). 
159  See Tracy R. Whitaker & Cudore L. Snell, Parenting While Powerless: Consequences 
of “the Talk”, 26 J. Hum. Behav. Soc. Env’t 303, 304 (2016). 
160  See Weaver et al., supra note 24, at 13–14; German Lopez, How Systemic Racism 
Entangles All Police Officers—Even Black Cops, Vox (Aug. 15, 2016, 9:35 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2015/5/7/8562077/police-racism-implicit-bias (revealing that a Black 
police office admitted “that after decades of working at the Baltimore Police Department and 
Maryland State Police, he harbored a strong bias against young black men”).  
161  Vesla M. Weaver, Black Citizenship and Summary Punishment: A Brief History to the 
Present, 17 Theory & Event (2014).  
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not only waive Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, but they also 
experience a deprivation of liberty that degrades their citizenship by 
robbing them of agency to define their own identity performativity.162 Yet 
when citizens protest aggressive policing, such as those who march in 
BLM protests to decry the brutal police killings of George Floyd and 
Breonna Taylor and so many others, they risk their Blackness being 
perceived as a threat and inducing a violent police response. This lose-
lose situation, which undoubtedly will trigger a chilling effect on 
constitutional free speech,163 perhaps explains why protestors who shout 
“Black Lives Matter” in affirmation of Black humanity are quickly met 
by heavily armed police officers ready for a fight.164 Their Blackness is 
deemed fighting words. 
To be sure, there are myriad reasons why anger might surface at the 
mere sound of BLM protestors marching down the street. In his treatise 
on the art of persuasion, Rhetoric, Aristotle defines anger as “desire, 
accompanied with pain, for conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight 
that was directed against oneself or those near to one, when such a slight 
is undeserved.”165 Perhaps when white citizens or white police officers 
find themselves as the subject of an injustice that sits in the belly of 
American history, far beyond their reach, some perceive an undeserved 
“slight,” a disregard for and deprivation of their moral desert that is 
painful because it undermines their moral worth.166 Perhaps from such 
 
162  See Toussaint, supra note 35, at 380 (noting that “political equality requires not only 
civil rights protecting one’s freedom from interference, but even more, it calls for public 
autonomy—freedom from domination”); Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the 
Law: Three Approaches, 72 Law & Contemp. Probs. 37, 43 (2009). 
163  See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1633, 1650 (2013) (“[T]he government is under a duty not only to refrain from regulating 
protected expression but also to promote it. At the same time, freedom of expression is also a 
preferred value, such that, when it conflicts with other state values—such as the interest in 
regulating unprotected expression—it must receive more weight.” (footnotes omitted)).  
164  An online spreadsheet reveals more than 1000 videos of recent instances of police 
brutality directed against non-violent protesters. T. Greg Doucette & Jason E. Miller, 
GeorgeFloyd Protest—Police Brutality Videos on Twitter, Google Docs, https://docs.-
google.com/spreadsheets/u/1/d/1YmZeSxpz52qT-10tkCjWOwOGkQqle7Wd1P7ZM1wM-
W0E/htmlview?pru=AAABcql6DI8*mIHYeMnoj9XWUp3Svb_KZA# [https://perma.cc/-
2V8R-BXGL] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).  
165  Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (Feb. 1, 2010), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/index.html [https://perma.cc/N358-A2Z6].  
166  Aristotle, Rhetoric bk. II, ch. 2 (J.H. Freese ed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1926), 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Rh.+2.2&fromdoc=Perseus-
%3Atext%3A1999.01.0060 [https://perma.cc/4NS9-5JB7] (“Slighting is an actualization of 
opinion in regard to something which appears valueless; for things which are really bad or 
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pain arises a hasty and irrational desire for revenge, for a rectificatory 
justice that remedies a seemingly unequal distribution of harm caused by 
the follies of our ancestors. Yet when neither the perceived offender nor 
the recipient of the perceived undeserved slight is the source of the 
injustice that animates their despair, the resulting brawl only deepens the 
wounds they share. Rather than inflict the specific pain of regret in the 
body of the other, such acts of revenge in response to anti-racist speech 
simply deepen the wounds of racial division resonant in the body politic. 
At this point in the analysis, an underlying and unresolved tension in 
the First Amendment’s treatment of racial issues remains unanswered—
is the phrase Black Lives Matter or its symbolic representation in the 
bodies of Black protestors lining the streets of America unprotected 
public speech? Is Blackness “fighting words”? Perhaps the inconsistency 
among courts on the meaning of fighting words, coupled with the 
protections afforded police officers by the qualified immunity doctrine, 
explains why George Floyd’s protest against the brutal policing tactics of 
Officer Derek Chauvin while lying on a Minnesota street—Mr. Floyd 
declaring with muffled voice, “Please, please, please, I can’t breathe”—
was met by Officer Chauvin’s knee pressed ever more firmly upon Mr. 
Floyd’s neck for eight minutes and forty-six seconds.167 Perhaps Mr. 
Floyd’s plea for dignity as a Black man under arrest in America was 
simply deemed the fighting words of an American brute.168 
 
good, or tend to become so, we consider worthy of attention, but those which are of no 
importance or trifling we ignore. Now there are three kinds of slight: disdain, spitefulness, and 
insult.”). 
167 Elisha Fieldstadt, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Man Dies After Pleading with Officer Attempting 
To Detain Him in Minneapolis, NBC News (May 26, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/-
news/us-news/man-dies-after-pleading-i-can-t-breathe-during-arrest-n1214586 [https://per-
ma.cc/ZF7S-XJT7]. This time (eight minutes and forty-six seconds) is disputed. See Evan Hill 
et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/-
Y3YT-N5JL]. 
168  Although beyond the scope of this Essay, this argument also suggests an underexplored 
tension between (a) the First Amendment’s lack of protection for “fighting words” that 
threaten harm to their target and an imminent breach of the peace, and (b) the Fourth 
Amendment’s permission of deadly force by police officers in response to an imminent threat 
of serious bodily harm to themselves or others. See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 
1723 (2019) (holding that the presence of probable cause for an arrest defeats a First 
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law). 
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V. BLACK LIVES AND IMMINENT LAWLESSNESS 
Unfortunately, Justice William Brennan got it wrong in Texas v. 
Johnson when he said that “the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive 
or disagreeable.”169 The government does prohibit the free expression of 
certain ideas that society finds offensive or disagreeable. Maybe this 
explains why federal and local governments, and their police officers, 
have silenced protestors with curfews and threats of arrest,170 all while 
onlookers yell in retort, “All Lives Matter.”171 Maybe this explains why 
the very idea of liberty and equality for Black and Brown Americans,172 
the very notion of Black lives deserving human moral dignity,173 the very 
suggestion of a Black feminist lens to critique socioeconomic injustice,174 
 
169 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
170  See Devlin Barrett, Cities Increasingly Turn to Curfews Hoping To Subdue Violence, 
Retake Control of the Streets, Wash. Post (June 1, 2020, 6:40 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/curfew-george-floyd-protests-
minneapolis-washington-new-york/2020/06/01/0d58b638-a44d-11ea-b619-
3f9133bbb482_story.html [https://perma.cc/7ZWD-PQUU]; Mark Berman & Emily Wax-
Thibodeaux, Police Keep Using Force Against Peaceful Protesters, Prompting Sustained 
Criticism About Tactics and Training, Wash. Post (June 4, 2020, 1:02 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/police-keep-using-force-against-peaceful-
protesters-prompting-sustained-criticism-about-tactics-and-training/2020/06/03/5d2f51d4-
a5cf-11ea-bb20-ebf0921f3bbd_story.html [https://perma.cc/YT8B-GQ7D]; Alex Woodward, 
Louisville Police Threaten Protesters with Arrests, Tear Gas in Wake of Breonna Taylor 
Grand Jury, Independent (Sept. 23, 2020, 11:33 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/-
news/world/americas/breonna-taylor-protests-louisville-grand-jury-teargas-latest-b559656.-
html [https://perma.cc/AF6L-Q3RF]; Natasha Lennard, The President’s War on Dissent Is 
Using Trumped-Up Federal Charges, Intercept (Oct. 31, 2020, 8:00 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2020/10/31/protests-federal-charges-trump/ [https://perma.cc/FT74-
P469].  
171  Daniel Victor, Why ‘All Lives Matter’ Is Such a Perilous Phrase, N.Y. Times (July  
15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/us/all-lives-matter-black-lives-matter.html 
[https://perma.cc/BKW9-A95F]. 
172  See Stokely Carmichael & Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation 
in America 77 (1992) (“The [American] Creed is supposed to contain considerations of 
equality and liberty, at least certainly equal opportunity, and justice. The fact is, of course, that 
these are simply words which were not even originally intended to have applicability to black 
people . . . .”).  
173  See Austin Channing Brown, I’m Still Here: Black Dignity in a World Made for 
Whiteness 79–80 (2018) (“We must remind ourselves and one another that we are fearfully 
and wonderfully made, arming ourselves against the ultimate message of whiteness—that we 
are inferior.”).  
174  See Patricia Hill Collins, Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice, at 
xvi (1998) (“Despite long-standing claims by elites that Blacks, women, Latinos, and other 
similarly derogated groups in the United States remain incapable of producing the type of 
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is often suppressed in mainstream discourse as the ideas of a lunatic 
fringe. Maybe it is the very idea of Blackness as something other than 
property that becomes fighting words in the eyes of American 
exceptionalism; a type of symbolic speech so harmful to white 
supremacy, so capable of inciting imminent lawless action, so disruptive 
of order-maintenance policing, that it is deemed a peril to the veil of white 
supremacy that looms over the American constitutional order, and 
consequently, is prohibited from the public square. Maybe this explains 
why police officers arrive to BLM protests with guns and tanks and 
shields and gas, long before the first stone has been thrown or the first 
rallying cry has been sung. 
Maybe it is Blackness as fighting words that explains why some police 
officers believe they are authorized to use brutal force when citizens 
“insult” them with anti-racist rhetoric. Officer Sunil Dutta declared in a 
Washington Post opinion editorial in 2014, “[I]f you don’t want to get 
shot, tased, pepper-sprayed, struck with a baton or thrown to the ground, 
just do what I tell you.”175 Such statements are not viewed as irrational 
articulations of implicit bias and deeply harbored racist ideas in policing 
culture, but instead they are deemed rational responses to disorderly 
behavior that reassert police authority,176 limit resistance to law and 
order,177 and instill fear among the citizenry that deters criminal activity. 
Yet Daria Roithmayr argues that such rationality is dubious; aggressive 
policing weakens community trust and undermines police legitimacy, 
 
interpretive, analytical thought that is labeled theory in the West, powerful knowledges of 
resistance that toppled former structures of social inequality repudiate this view.”).  
175  Sunil Dutta, I’m a Cop. If You Don’t Want To Get Hurt, Don’t Challenge Me., Wash. 
Post (Aug. 19, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/-
08/19/im-a-cop-if-you-dont-want-to-get-hurt-dont-challenge-me/ [https://perma.cc/JWR2-
DC4B].  
176  See, e.g., Paul J. Hirschfield & Daniella Simon, Legitimating Police Violence: 
Newspaper Narratives of Deadly Force, 14 Theoretical Criminology 155, 155 (2010) (noting 
how newspapers often “cast victims of police killings as physical and social threats and situate 
[police-perpetrated homicides] within legitimate institutional roles”); Jasmine R. Silver, Sean 
Patrick Roche, Thomas J. Bilach & Stephanie Bontrager Ryon, Traditional Police Culture, 
Use of Force, and Procedural Justice: Investigating Individual, Organizational, and Contextual 
Factors, 34 Just. Q. 1272, 1275 (2017) (“Officers may also feel a desire to ‘maintain the edge’ 
against citizens by refusing to back down, even in response to verbal resistance, by 
demonstrating their authority whenever possible.” (citations omitted)).  
177  See, e.g., Paul K. Huth, Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and 
Theoretical Debates, 2 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 25, 26–27 (1999). 
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provoking dissent that merely leads to further aggression by police 
officers, a vicious cycle.178 
Maybe it is Blackness as fighting words that explains why some 
protests seem to inevitably devolve into the socially destructive and self-
defeating act of rioting—“[a]n unlawful disturbance of the peace by [a 
crowd].”179 To be sure, in many instances, it is extremists who seek to 
exploit peaceful protests for their own political ends.180 But maybe, in 
other cases, America has simply failed to hear Black America speak. 
Maybe, as Martin Luther King, Jr., suggested in 1967,  
It has failed to hear that the plight of the Negro poor has worsened over 
the last few years. It has failed to hear that the promises of freedom and 
justice have not been met. And it has failed to hear that large segments 
of white society are more concerned about tranquility and the status quo 
than about justice, equality, and humanity.181   
After all, America boasts a rich legacy of violating the First 
Amendment rights of Black protestors. During the height of the Civil 
Rights Movement, across the segregated South, thousands of Black 
protestors were jailed for peacefully marching in dissent to a state-
sponsored system of racial oppression.182 Indeed, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
was arrested and jailed in Birmingham, Alabama, in April 1963 for 
engaging in coordinated non-violent marches, sit-ins, and prayers in 
defiance of nationwide policies of racial segregation.183 While 
imprisoned, King wrote the Letter from Birmingham Jail, in which he 
famously declared, “We know through painful experience that freedom is 
never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the 
oppressed.”184 However, before a demand can be answered, it must be 
heard. 
 
178  See Daria Roithmayr, The Dynamics of Excessive Force, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 407, 
424–26. 
179  Riot, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
180 See Neil MacFarquhar, Many Claim Extremists Are Sparking Protest Violence. But 
Which Extremists?, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/-
31/us/george-floyd-protests-white-supremacists-antifa.html [https://perma.cc/RY2Y-9NXP]. 
181 Martin Luther King, Jr., The Other America, Address at Stanford University (Apr. 14, 
1967), https://www.crmvet.org/docs/otheram.htm [https://perma.cc/QJ9E-FMBL]. 
182  See generally Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–63 
(1988) (describing challenges that protestors endured during the Civil Rights Movement 
between the years 1954 and 1963). 
183  Id. at 730–31. 
184  Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail 5 (Apr. 16, 1963). 
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We’ve been told that to be Black and poor in America is to speak the 
language of the unheard. But maybe not. Maybe to be Black and poor in 
America is to merely represent a subset of a larger faction of citizens 
whose identity is altogether silenced, a faction of citizens whose speech 
is deemed unworthy of constitutional protection because it will 
undeniably stir a fight in the heart of white supremacy. Maybe to be Black 
and poor in America is to have one’s voice, one’s protests, one’s identity 
be given such slight social value as to always be outweighed by the 
immediate threat and direct harm to the preservation of the racial status 
quo, the privileges and “qualified immunities” of whiteness.185 Indeed, 
even if one believes that the First Amendment, in theory, protects the free 
speech of Black citizens, the discretionary power granted to police 
officers to adjudicate such rights, in practice, renders freedom of speech 
in America a sham.  
If we truly believe that Black Lives Matter, we must reckon with the 
anguish and guilt borne from America’s legacy of racial oppression, rival 
emotions that have shaped a toxic relationship between Black Americans 
and the police.186 Assertions of Black humanity have long ignited the rage 
of the patrol. And assemblies in defiance of white supremacy have long 
triggered breaches of the peace. Even more, we must protest the inequities 
that a racist color-consciousness has forged across the American 
landscape. We must embrace the human moral dignity of Black lives, 
even if it provokes anger in the heart of the privileged.187 While some 
argue that such public displays of emotion are futile, undermining 
progress by “introducing or reinforcing divisions, hierarchies, and forms 
of neglect or obtuseness,”188 Audre Lorde clarifies the moral utility of 
anger, declaring, 
[A]nger between peers births change, not destruction, and the 
discomfort and sense of loss it often causes is not fatal, but a sign of 
 
185  See generally Timothy C. Shiell, African Americans and the First Amendment: The Case 
for Liberty and Equality 33 (2019) (analyzing American suppression of dissent against the 
status quo); see also Hansford, supra note 19, at 688 (“When ideas on race that would disrupt 
the racial hierarchy of white over Black emerge, the First Amendment is disproportionately 
applied to trample that dissent.”). 
186  See Girardeau A. Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, 2018 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1025, 1052 
(pointing out that “the United States criminal justice system is characterized by racial 
disparities that are stark, pervasive, intentional, and often fatal”). 
187  See Alexander, supra note 53, at 12–13; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 387 (1987). 
188  Martha C. Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice 2 (2013). 
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growth. My response to racism is anger. . . . It has served me as fire in 
the ice zone of uncomprehending eyes . . . [that] see in my experience 
and the experience of my people only new reasons for fear or guilt.189  
In other words, anger confers a sense of power and agency to harmed 
citizens as they wade through a messy and uncertain world. Our challenge 
lies not in squelching anger but in channeling such power toward 
constructive ends.  
Finally, we must wrestle with the unresolved racial subtext of modern 
policing, a culture that exploits the ambiguities of the First Amendment 
to silence the legitimate public protests of minoritized citizens. Too often, 
police officers appear as mere instruments of the state when they respond 
to collective moral dissent with brutal violence.190 Rather than stand idle 
or encourage protestors to retreat in fear of their safety, we must learn to 
embrace the pain of America’s past as a catalyst for collective healing, “a 
tension in the mind” that can help us rise “from the dark depths of 
prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and 
brotherhood.”191 In other words, if Blackness has in fact become fighting 
words, then we must fight back. 
CONCLUSION  
I learned at the age of fourteen that the police officers who killed 
Amadou Diallo were all acquitted after three days of deliberation, a cruel 
reminder of the power of whiteness in America.192 And I recently learned 
that in 2015, one of Amadou’s killers was promoted to the rank of 
sergeant, despite objections from Amadou’s mother.193 Perhaps they 
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never heard her protest after the street brawl had come to an end. After 
all, when Amadou was killed, his mother did not have the modern 
megaphone of Twitter to amplify her son’s name and mobilize the masses. 
As for the protests currently making their way across the landscape, 
some have argued that they are merely reflective of American history—
from the Boston Tea Party to the Revolutionary War to the Civil Rights 
Movement.194 Notwithstanding, despite a history of racial oppression that 
stands alongside the transformative power of collective dissent, maybe in 
today’s America, the phrase “Black Lives Matter” and other forms of 
public speech that affirm Black humanity have simply turned into fighting 
words. If that is indeed the case, maybe we should reconsider the utility 
of a policing culture that reinforces white privilege while promoting 
Black subjugation. Maybe police abolition is in fact the answer. To be 
sure, police abolition will likely occur as a gradual process of reform 
within the context of rethinking the entire criminal justice system.195 But 
the weight of history suggests that police reform may not be enough.196 
In my view, one thing remains clear: if Blackness is fighting words, 
then we should heed the words of Frederick Douglass preached at 
Canandaigua, New York, on August 3, 1857: 
If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor 
freedom and yet depreciate agitation are men who want crops without 
plowing up the ground, they want rain without thunder and lightning. 
They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This 
struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be 
both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle.197  
In other words, until that day of moral reckoning, until the majority of 
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Black humanity amidst the perpetual and unjustified assault on Black 
lives, until the rain and thunder and lightning agitate a wounded American 
consciousness and fragile American soul, folks who react to the words 
“Black Lives Matter” with retaliatory violence can, as they say in the 
South Bronx, “catch these hands.”  
 
